CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN INDIA

Abstract

The power of constitutional amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution of India reflects the dynamic nature of constitutional governance. However, the exercise of this power has historically generated intense constitutional conflict between Parliament and the Judiciary. This paper critically examines the evolution of judicial review in relation to constitutional amendments, tracing its doctrinal development through landmark judicial pronouncements. Beginning with the early phase of parliamentary supremacy in Sankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh, the analysis moves through the transformative decision in Golak Nath, culminating in the crystallisation of the Basic Structure Doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati and its reaffirmation in Minerva Mills. The study argues that judicial review of constitutional amendments has emerged not merely as a procedural safeguard but as a substantive constitutional mechanism to preserve the identity, supremacy, and structural integrity of the Constitution. The continuing tension between legislative sovereignty and constitutional supremacy is examined through contemporary developments, including electoral disqualification jurisprudence and institutional confrontations. The paper concludes that while Parliament possesses wide constituent power, such power is not unlimited. The Basic Structure Doctrine represents a uniquely Indian constitutional innovation that reconciles democratic will with constitutional morality. Judicial review, therefore, operates as a guardian of constitutional continuity rather than an adversary of democratic governance.